Phronesis and Virtue Internalisation

James Brown

Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, University of Birmingham

Barr's Hill School, Coventry

Thank you!

- PESGB
- Kristján

Introduction

- Philosophical assumptions: moral realism; anti-Humeanism
- One cannot be virtuous without *phronesis*, nor can one possess *phronesis* without virtue (Aristotle, 2004, p. 166 [1144b30–32]).
- *Phronesis* can facilitate the internalisation of virtue (Jubilee Centre, 2022; Kristjánsson, 2017)
- Context: paradox of moral education (Peters, 1981)
- <u>How</u> might *phronesis* facilitate the internalisation of virtue?

Phronesis

- Aristotelian *phronesis* model's (APM) components/functions:
    - i. *Constitutive* (moral perception)
    - ii. *Emotional regulative* (reason-infused emotion)
    - iii. *Blueprint* (a general justifiable conception of the good life)
    - iv. *Integrative* (adjudication between conflicting virtues) (Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2024)

Virtue Internalisation

- Virtue "internalisation" via the <u>motivation</u> component
- Organismic Integration Theory's (OIT) regulatory types:
    a. *External* (external rewards/punishments)
    b. *Introjected* (internal rewards/punishments, e.g. pride or guilt)
    c. *Identified* (behaviour seen as personally important)
    d. *Integrated* (activity coheres with personal values) (Ryan & Deci, 2017)
- A virtue is internalised as its motivation moves from (a) to (d)
- Example

Connection 1

- (iii) Blueprint Component → (c) Identified Regulation
- Having a blueprint of the good life encourages one to personally value or identify with behaviours that align with that blueprint.

Connection 2

- (c) Identified Regulation → (iv) Integrative Component
- The integrative function of phronesis needs virtues to act upon; one cannot adjudicate between conflicting virtues until one has sufficiently internalised – at least to the level of (c) – at least two virtues.

Connection 3

- (iv) Integrative Component → (d) Integrated Regulation
- Apparent conflict among internalised virtues must be resolved before one can experience the self as fully coherent.

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