- Virtue ethics
- Self-determination theory (SDT)
- Character development and education
- Virtue measurement and evaluation
- Paradox of moral education
- Further reading
1. Virtue ethics
As educators, we want to empower our students to make good decisions. But what makes a decision good? Some argue that a decision is good if it produces good consequences (consequentialism); others, if it follows a set of rules (deontology). But consequences can be hard to predict, and rules can be abstract or inflexible.
Virtue ethics takes a more holistic approach. According to Aristotle – widely regarded as the originator of virtue ethics – a good decision is one that contributes to living well or flourishing. Flourishing involves the ongoing development and expression of virtues, especially moral virtues such as bravery, justice, honesty, kindness, gratitude, humility, and citizenship. So, in this framework, a decision is good if it is brave, just, kind, and so on.
There are other types of virtue – namely, intellectual virtues (e.g., critical thinking, curiosity) and performance virtues (e.g., confidence, determination). But only the moral virtues are intrinsically valuable – that is, valuable in themselves. Intellectual and performance virtues are only instrumentally valuable: they are valuable insofar as they help serve the moral virtues. Without moral direction, they can even be harmful. Consider the determination (a performance virtue) of Adolf Hitler, for example.
But what happens when virtues conflict? When honesty comes at the cost of kindness, for example, how do we choose? Aristotle proposed a meta-virtue called phronesis, or “practical wisdom”, which helps us adjudicate between competing virtues. It also helps us recognise morally salient situations, regulate our emotions, and maintain a guiding “blueprint” of what it means to flourish. For Aristotle, phronesis and virtue go hand in hand.
Another critical component of virtue is motivation. For Aristotle, an act is virtuous only if it is chosen for its own sake. This brings us to the next framework:
2. Self-Determination Theory (SDT)
SDT is a broad psychological framework for understanding human motivation. It distinguishes between:
- Intrinsic motivation: doing something for its inherent satisfaction
- Extrinsic motivation: doing something as a means to an end.
For example, if a child draws a picture because they enjoy drawing, then they are intrinsically motivated. If they draw a picture to earn a reward, then they are extrinsically motivated.
One of the most robust findings of SDT is that extrinsic rewards can undermine intrinsic motivation. If a child is rewarded for drawing, they may begin to see drawing only as a way to earn rewards. However, it is important to remember that this effect only applies to those who are already intrinsically motivated. For those who aren’t yet motivated, the evidence is less clear.
However, extrinsic motivation is not a single phenomenon. SDT distinguishes various types of extrinsic motivation, which vary in their relative autonomy. For example, a child might brush their teeth to avoid punishment, while an adult might do so because they value personal hygiene. In both cases, the motivation is extrinsic – but the adult’s motivation is more autonomous or internalised.
SDT also posits three basic psychological needs:
- Autonomy – feeling in control of one’s behaviour
- Competence – feeling effective and capable
- Relatedness – feeling connected to others
Satisfying these needs facilitates internalisation. For example, encouraging certain forms of reflection can facilitate internalisation by satisfying the need for competence. Conversely, extrinsic rewards can undermine internalisation by frustrating the need for autonomy (rewards are often experienced as controlling).
3. Character development and education
Good character consists in moral virtues. I believe that character develops as one internalises virtues – where a virtue is internalised as its motivation becomes increasingly autonomous. For example, if a child is kind initially on the promise of rewards, but in time comes to value kindness for its own sake, then this shift in motivation would comprise a development in character.
Character education might be defined as the deliberate attempt to facilitate this internalisation process – by satisfying a child’s need for autonomy, competence, or relatedness with respect to moral virtues. Incidentally, the Jubilee Centre‘s strategies of character “caught”, “taught”, and “sought” align neatly with SDT’s needs for relatedness, competence, and autonomy (respectively).
Am I placing too much emphasis on motivation? After all, motivation is only one component of virtue – alongside perception, emotion, desire, and behaviour – and no single component should be morally evaluated in isolation. I would argue that motivation subsumes the other components as either antecedents (perception, emotion, desire) or consequents (behaviour) – it is the glue that binds a virtue together. Also, it is only through the lens of motivation that we can make sense of what it means for a virtue to be internalised. None of the other components accommodate an internal/external division.
4. Virtue measurement and evaluation
Thinking about virtue internalisation in terms of motivation opens the door to something important yet difficult – measuring virtue. A person’s virtue could be measured by how autonomously motivated they are to engage in behaviours that express that virtue. For example, if I wanted to measure your gratitude, I might ask how autonomously motivated you are to keep a gratitude journal (a gratitude-related behaviour). This could be assessed using self-report tools such as the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI) or Self-Regulation Questionnaires (SRQs).
This also enables us to evaluate character education interventions. Suppose I wanted to test whether a particular intervention increases students’ gratitude. I could recruit a sample of students to engage in gratitude journaling, then randomly assign them to one of two groups: an intervention group and a control group. By measuring their motivation before and after the intervention, I could compare changes across the groups. A significant increase in autonomous motivation in the intervention group, compared to the control group, would suggest that the intervention had a positive effect.
But what if no students initially volunteer to participate in gratitude journaling? One option is to encourage participation via extrinsic rewards. However, since rewards can undermine motivation, it would be important to first exclude students who are already autonomously motivated. This could be done using a filtration script designed to identify and filter out such students in advance.
5. Paradox of moral education
There are several versions of this paradox. First, as originally formulated:
How can the Palace of Reason be entered uncritically through the courtyard of Habit and Tradition?
In other words: How can someone be taught to think for themselves? Because if they are taught, then to what extent is their thinking really their own? Another, more general formulation: How can someone become self-governing (autonomous) through training that is governed by others (heteronomous)?
I think of it like this: Moral motivation must ultimately come from within – otherwise, it is not properly moral. But educators are necessarily external to their students. So how can an external influence encourage something to originate internally? Impossible, perhaps. Maybe the whole enterprise of character education is a fool’s errand.
Still, it is noble fool’s errand.