Below is the first essay I wrote for my MA in Character Education (2022-25), in which I revisit some of the themes from my first essay on character education. I also introduce two new ideas:
The first is what I call the “villain” test for prospective programmes of character education. Character education should aim to cultivate moral virtues (honesty, kindness, respect, etc.). So, if a set of virtues is to form an adequate basis for a programme of character education, then one must not be able to imagine a villain (someone deeply alienated from moral virtue, e.g. a Mafioso) sincerely exemplifying those virtues (without ceasing to be a villain). I argue that PRIDE at Barr’s Hill (as it was back then) fails this baseline test. While PRIDE included some moral elements, they were often instrumentalised as a means to earning rewards – namely, PRIDE Points. And, indeed, it is easy to imagine a villain affecting a moral facade in order to earn rewards. I should stress, however, that Barr’s Hill has since revised its approach to character education, placing much greater emphasis on explicitly moral virtues.
The second new idea is less of an idea, more of a realisation. Despite strong evidence that extrinsic rewards undermine intrinsic motivation, there were still those who maintained that rewards might play a positive role in character education. How so? Was intrinsic motivation not essential for character development, after all? Or was there some overlooked nuance?
I continue this investigation in my next essay.